A Flawed Policy in Lebanon?

September 18, 2006

Diaz Hendropriyono
Washington DC

In mid-July, Hizbollah ground forces ranged across the Lebanese border into Israel, capturing two Israeli soldiers, killing three and sparking a destructive month-long war. The clash included at least 15,500 Israeli Air Force sorties into Lebanon and the firing of 4,000 Hizbollah Russian-made Katyusha rockets into Israel. The casualties stand at more than 1,500 Lebanese and 40 Israeli civilians.

On Aug. 11, the United Nations Security Council passed UN Resolution 1701. It calls for the cessation of hostilities, the disarmament of the guerrillas, and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon. Hizbollah expressed reservations at the outset, but eventually both sides agreed. The mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon was extended until Aug. 31, 2007 to ensure the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon and to restore peace.

World democracies responded favorably to this plan to end the conflict. The resolution authorized a 15,000-member peacekeeping force, and the European Union provided the backbone by pledging a deployment of 6,900 troops. At least three countries with Muslim majorities (Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia) also promised to send soldiers to fill the remaining slots. Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda recently announced the government's plan to send 1,000 troops.

While sending Indonesian troops may quell domestic anger over the Middle East conflict and dissuade militants from going to Lebanon to conduct jihad, this foreign policy move may prove damaging. First, although it eventually agreed to Indonesia's participation, Israel initially resisted the involvement of countries that did not recognize the Jewish state, including Indonesia, which has the world's largest Muslim population. Consequently, Indonesia's troop participation may stave off any form of relationship between these two countries, or perhaps between Indonesia and the U.S. -- Israel's largest foreign aid donor since 1976, bestowing $357 million in Economic Support Funds and $2.2 billion in Foreign Military Financing in fiscal year 2005 alone.

Furthermore, French President Jacques Chirac said the 15,000-member force, alongside another 15,000 troops from the Lebanese army, is simply excessive. If he is correct, then an additional 1,000 Indonesian soldiers may be superfluous, and may have no significant impact on the peace process.

Third, Indonesia's financial constraints may hamper the plan's implementation and distract from other, more pressing needs. The House has approved a budget of Rp 355 billion (about US$39 million) for the peacekeeping operation, which is a burden on the state budget. Whether the UN will fully reimburse the spending, as Indonesia claims the international body has promised to do, remains to be seen. In fact, House budget committee leader Emir Moeis has said the UN will only reimburse logistical and operational costs, which unfortunately account for a mere 20 percent of the total budget. That leaves Indonesia to pay the remaining Rp 287 billion.

The money allotted for the purchase of 32 armored cars from France could be used for other purposes. It could rebuild about 20,000 houses destroyed by the recent natural disasters in Central Java and Yogyakarta, at a cost of approximately Rp 15 million each. The funds could also be used to increase the promised oil subsidies in 2007 and to sustain the affordability of gasoline in anticipation of future gas price volatility. Additionally, the amount spent on troop deployment could help offset the upcoming payment of the 13th month salary and pensions of civil servants and retirees.

Even if these monetary outlays are partially or fully reimbursed, the potential for Indonesian casualties is real, and those losses would be truly irreplaceable. During last month's conflict, four UN Truce Supervision Organization members from Austria, Finland, Canada and China were killed in Israeli air attacks.

The current administration does not have to turn a deaf ear to the public outcry over the Middle East crisis. However, there are other ways to help. Sending tents, sleeping beds, pillows, medicine, food, water and other essentials is a more practical approach, especially since more than 900,000 Lebanese and tens of thousands of Israelis were displaced by the conflict. Furthermore, Indonesian citizens could participate in the relief efforts by contributing to reliable humanitarian organizations such as Islamic Relief, LIFE, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and many others. The administration must assume a central role to encourage Indonesians to participate.

The writer is PhD student at the Center for Public Administration and Policy, Virginia Tech University.

Taken From: http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20060918.E02

War in Iraq Imprudently Decided During Financial Turmoil

June 14, 2006

Diaz Hendropriyono

Washington, DC

Until now, I am still puzzled by the Bush policy to start the War in Iraq. How could he decide to go to Iraq when the financial situation in the U.S. was not conducive to fund the war? The decision to go into Iraq was made when the U.S. was faced with financial troubles.

First, the federal government had just experienced a deficit of $158 billion in 2002, after enjoying a surplus since 1998, in which it produced $69 billion. It was the federal government’s first surplus since a $3 billion surplus in 1969. The government’s finance was characterized by large annual budget deficits from the early 1980s through the early 1990s. Factors contributed to this situation included a severe recession in the early 1980s, a sharply increased spending for national defense during the 1980s, and a continued expansion of spending on entitlement programs, such as Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid.

Second, the U.S. economy was experiencing a downturn in the early part of the 21st century. The National Bureau of Economic Research announced that the world’s largest economy sank into a recession in March 2001, marking the end of the nation’s longest economic expansion of ten years. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth slowed by summer of 2001 and then declined over the second half of the year before finally picked up. Business fixed investment fell sharply, declining an estimated 3.6% in 2001 after eight straight years of growth above 8%. Real consumption only grew 3% compared to 5% for the last three years. U.S. employment fell by 1.1 million jobs while the unemployment rate increased to 5.8%, showing its highest level in seven years. In reaction to the weak economy in 2001, U.S. employers cut around 415,000 jobs, the biggest since May of 1980, which involved 460,000 job losses.

Third, the events of 9/11 changed federal spending dramatically, especially on strengthening homeland security. For example, through the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Congress created the Transportation and Security Administration (TSA), charged with developing policies to ensure the safety of U.S. air traffic. TSA personnel took over airport security from the airlines employing private screeners and replaced them with a better-paid and better-trained work force a few months after the attacks. The move to federalize airport security obviously did not come without any cost. The Bush Administration originally submitted a $4.4 billion budget request for TSA for fiscal year 2002 and $4.8 billion for fiscal year 2003 in the Emergency Supplemental bill. While the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its request, the House cut the funding for the newly-created agency to $3.85 billion for fiscal year 2002, or $550 million below the administration’s request. Its approved budget for fiscal year 2003 was $4.95 billion. And the remainder of the agency’s budget would come from user fees, such as a security fee on airline tickets.

The Anthrax attacks have also increased the nation’s financial burden. The outbreak, which caused four deaths, including two postal workers, cost the United States Postal Service $5 billion in equipment damage, clean-up efforts and lost revenues.

Fourth, in June 2001, President Bush signed a $1.35 trillion tax cut into law. Although the relief, which would occur slowly over the next decade, was smaller than the $1.6 trillion amount that he originally proposed, Bush hailed it as major victory. After fulfilling his campaign promise, he stated that tax relief has only occurred twice since WWII, during the Kennedy’s administration and Reagan’s presidency. “And now it’s happening for the third time, and it’s about time,” said he. Although tax cut would normally boost national economy, a study conducted by Peter Yoo of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in 1996 concluded that consumers saved most of a tax cut in the months immediately after the tax relief occurred. He found that the 1964 tax cut did not result in an immediate increase in spending. This tax cut would substantially contribute to deteriorating the budget outlook. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the tax cut coupled with the increases in discretionary spending would worsen the budget outlook by $550 billion in fiscal year 2002.

Fifth, on September 22, 2001, President Bush signed into law H.R. 2926, the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act to “provide compensation to any individual, or relatives of a deceased individual, who was physically injured or killed as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001,” as stated in Section 403, Title IV of ATSSSA. By December 2003, a total of 2,823 death claims, averaging $1.8 million per claim, in addition to 3,517 injury claims were received. The $18 billion federal bailout was also meant to help the airline industry since the families receiving the compensation must renounce all rights to sue airline companies whose airplanes were used in the attacks. Rand Corporation study reported that by November 2004, these individuals as well as businesses impacted by the attacks had received $38.1 billion in compensation. Of this, the federal assistance amounted to $15.8 billion, insurance companies contributed $19.6 billion, and charitable groups donated $2.7 billion.

Sixth, in February 2003, the U.S. national debt had become so high that Treasury Secretary John Snow urged Congress to raise the debt ceiling to maintain the full faith and credit of the U.S. government and avoid any negative repercussions both at home and abroad. Such a request came with criticisms as the borrowing limit had just been upped by $450 billion to $6.4 trillion in June 2002. Representative Ron Paul described the request to increase the debt limit showed the administration’s fiscal irresponsibility and would endanger the U.S. economy. Senator Kent Conrad stated that the Bush administration “wants our children and grandchildren to pay our bills.” The House, however, agreed to a $984 billion increase as part of its 2004 budget blueprint.

Seventh, the War on Terror was launched in October 2001 with the deployment of U.S. military troops to Afghanistan. At the start of the war, the Center for Strategic and Budget Assessments estimated the Afghan invasion, aided by the United Kingdom and the NATO alliance, would cost “a staggering $400 to $800 million in its first 25 days of action.” Initially, Congress provided $17.4 billion to the Defense Department for the overall war on terrorism. However, in March 2002, President Bush requested another $14 billion to fund for the remaining months of the fiscal year. Such a request was considered reasonable knowing the high costs of war (A carrier-based F/A-18 fighter-bomber costs $5,000 an hour to fly; 90 Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles, used by the U.S. Navy, cost about $1 million apiece). Thus, it is not surprising that the Afghan War had already cost $4.4 billion since the start of the war through Feb 2002. At a price tag of around $1 billion a month the Afghan War had become the nation’s most expensive war since Vietnam (For comparison, the 78-day air attack against the Serbians in Kosovo in 1999 cost about $3 billion, and the Gulf War in 1991 only cost $2 billion, after the original cost of $14 billion was offset by reimbursements from a few grateful Persian Gulf Nations).

Finally, the decision was made when the U.S. economy was suffering from a sluggish growth in the first quarter of 2003 and when was facing the growing costs of entitlement programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid—costing $397 billion and $438 billion in 2002 and 2003, respectively.

Knowing all these financial difficulties that the US was facing, how could Bush decide to go to Iraq when we all knew from the beginning that the U.S. could not afford to wage this war—at least financially.

The federal deficits, significant economic decline since March 2001, the increased security measures in response to the 9/11 attacks, the tax cuts in 2001 (which inevitably would fuel more deficits), the compensation package given to the family of 9/11 victims, the rise in national debt, and the already-high price of executing the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, should have shown the clearest evidence that the funding of the Operation Iraqi Freedom was going to be problematical from the very start.

Is There Any Benefit to be Gained from the Iraq War?

May 1, 2006

Diaz Hendropriyono
Washington, DC

At the time when the Iraq War was launched, the Bush administration expected that one major benefit of the war included the elimination of Iraq’s alleged WMD. The proliferation of nuclear weapons has been the U.S. greatest security challenge. Acting assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation Stephen Rademaker asserted that nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are capable of killing on a massive scale and it is imperative that “such weapons be kept out of the hands of rogue states and terrorists.”

Next, there was a belief that Saddam was linked to Al-Qaeda. Then-Secretary Colin Powell claimed that eliminating Iraq’s WMD defeated the possibility that such weapons could be used by Al-Qaeda’s terrorist networks to attack the U.S. And by defeating Saddam, the U.S. also defeats al-Qaeda’s ally.

Another potential benefit for invading Iraq was to restore democracy in the country. President Bush stated that democracy is a universal idea that is highly valued by any human being. He continued that in many Middle Eastern countries, especially Iraq, poverty is deep and spreading, women lack rights and denied schooling, democracy has failed and totalitarianism has extinguished the hopes of millions in the region. During his remarks at the National Endowment for Democracy, President Bush noted that there were about 40 democracies in the world in the 1970s. The number had become around 120 at the end of the 20th century as Portugal, Spain, Greece, South Africa, and many countries in East Asia and Latin America adopted this belief. The U.S. has been committed to support democracy to be adopted by countries throughout the world.

Fourth, predicting what would happen to oil prices in the aftermath of the War in Iraq may not be an easy task. Joseff Herbert argues that the fluctuation of oil prices would be highly dependent upon the length of the war, the world’s oil markets during the war, and the level of damage suffered to the Gulf oil fields. Nonetheless, the Bush administration was convinced that the Iraq War would bring oil prices down, which was peaking at $37.87 per barrel on March 12, 2003, and would create a more economically healthy U.S. economy. A chief economist at Chevy Chase Trust mentioned that “once the war is launched…I expect big drops in oil prices, and [even] gold prices, a strengthening US dollar and a rally in the stock market.”

With an estimate of 112.5 billion barrels in oil reserves, Iraq is the world’s second largest oil producer after Saudi Arabia. The Bush administration hoped that in the post-war era, with Iraqi’s oil production back in the pipeline, oil prices would significantly decrease. If oil prices could be brought down to $20 per barrel, the U.S. economy would receive a boost between $55 billion and $60 billion a year. This appeared likely. In fact, the Bush administration predicted that oil production in Iraq would exceed the pre-war level of 2.5 million barrel per day and increase to over 3 billion per day by the end of 2003.

The estimate grew more optimistic as it was known that only 15 of Iraq’s 74 discovered oil fields were developed, and only 125 of the 526 oil deposits had been drilled. Consequently, then US-backed Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmed Chalabi stated that “there’s not an oil company out there that wouldn’t be interested in Iraq… [and] American companies will have a big shot at Iraqi oil.”

The fifth benefit that was hoped to be had was an increase in the number of U.S. alliance throughout the world, especially the Middle East. When the war started, the Coalition of the Willing, countries which militarily supported and participated in the Iraq invasion and subsequent peacekeeping duties, consisted of 49 nations. These include the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, South Korea, Italy, Poland, Romania, Georgia, Japan, Denmark, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, among others.

Although Arab countries did not sound their support for the Iraq War, presumably thinking that it was not wise to be associated with military action and publicly identified with the U.S. action, these Gulf States would actually benefit from the Iraq War. When the war started in March, the world’s major stock markets were heading south. The U.S. Dow Jones industrial average downed 171.85 to 7568.18, the Nasdaq composite decreased 26.92 to 1278.37, and the S&P 500 Index lost 21.41 points to become 807.48. The London’s FTSE 100 index closed 3.1% lower at 3,743. Frankfurt’s Xetra DAX index slid 5.2% to 2,573. The CAC 40 in Paris plummeted 5.7% to 2,726. And while Milan’s MIB30 index slowed 3.1% and Zurich’s SMI dipped 5%, the AEX index in Amsterdam was hit a little bit worse, slumping 6.4%.

However, stock exchanges of nearly every Gulf State within easy reach of Iraq experienced the opposite. The Kuwait Stock Exchange index started the year at 2,352 and had reach 3,397 by the end of April, an increase of 44%. Qatar’s Doha Securities Market was up for more than 20%, while Saudi Arabia’s Tadawul index witnessed a surge of 16% within the same period. Furthermore, the Muscat Securities market in Oman and the EMNEX index in the United Arab Emirates increased by 14% and 9%, respectively. Indeed, two of Kuwaiti’s biggest mobile phone companies immediately established movable transmission towers that could be transferred across the border to start up service in its neighboring Iraq. In addition, Kuwait’s real estate prices had continued to expand fivefold. Dubai’s Jebel Ali port would play a major role as a transshipment hub following Iraq’s Umm Qasr port eventual development. And Qatar was confident that Iraq could become a potential market for its huge reserves once reconstruction starts. It was further expected that Saudi Arabia’s major companies—such as Savola, which manufactures edible oils, and the Zamil Group, which produces air conditioners and other household appliances—were seen to be among the best to gain new businesses in Iraq.

With these benefits anticipated to be gained by Iraq’s neighboring countries, the Bush administration was convinced that the Iraq War would strengthen its relation with these Arab States, and improve economic trade between the U.S. and those nations. More specifically, it was expected that Saudi Arabia’s exports to the U.S. would increase to at least over $20 billion a year and imports from the U.S. rise to over $5 billion a year in the post-Iraq war. The improved trade relation appeared very likely to occur, particularly knowing that the U.S. would topple a regime which owed $9 billion to the Saudi government.

Unfortunately, none of these benefits materialize, making the War in Iraq look like a war without any benefit at all.

For example, it was reported that neither stockpiles of chemical weapons nor evidence of recent WMD production has been found in Iraq. At this point, U.S. chief weapons inspector Charles Duelfer said that inquiries into WMD in Iraq have “gone as far as feasible.”

Furthermore, there was no relationship between Saddam and al-Qaeda. Although President Bush insisted that “Saddam Hussein has longstanding, direct and continuing ties to terrorist networks,” the public seemed to think otherwise. In fact, the Iraqi President himself denied any connection between his administration and al-Qaeda and boldly said “if we had a relationship with al-Qaeda…we wouldn’t be ashamed to admit it.” Additionally, the September 11 commission reported that although there had been contacts between Iraq and Al-Qaeda, there has been no “collaborative relationship” between them. The discord was then exacerbated as former U.S. Ambassador Joseph Wilson admitted that “the CIA was under pressure from the vice president to twist facts to make it appear that Iraq was an imminent nuclear threat.”

Third, the idea of installing democracy in Iraq has also been criticized. There have been several reasons as to why democracy in Iraq is not only undesirable, but also unfeasible. For example, there are still other alternatives to democracy that ensures more stability in the country. Then, with the Iraqi society that is too fragmented, Iraq is actually not ready for democracy. Next, the transition to democracy would be too dangerous and risky that it would take many lives. Also, the government that is created out of democracy is predicted to be too weak to run the country, as Iraqis are still hostile. In short, democracy in Iraq is expected to fail.

The fourth benefit that has not become a reality is the reduction in the price of oil. In September 2003, the price of standard crude oil on NYMEX was $25/barrel. By the following year, the price went up to $60/barrel. On August 29, 2005, it had reached $70.8/barrel. And on fears of Iran’s intensifying dispute with the West, by April 19, 2006, oil price hit a record $74 a barrel. This increased gasoline price in the U.S. to $3.11 per gallon is the highest since 1981 at $3.03 per gallon after adjusted for inflation. Although several factors contributed to the price increase—such as political problems in Venezuela, instability in West Africa, the fear of Iran’s nuclear program, the crippled supply flow of oil from the U.S. Gulf Coast in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and Saudi Arabia’s internal instability—the Iraq War fears have also lifted oil price.

Finally, it is obvious that the last benefit has not materialized either. A few years after the war started, the U.S. is still losing coalition partners in Iraq. Furthermore, the U.S. image in the Moslem countries, especially in the Middle East, has actually continued to worsen since the war began.

“What other kinds of benefits can be gained from the war?” I asked.

War in Iraq has Little Impact on Deficit?

April 12, 2006

Diaz Hendropriyono
Washington, DC

Hold on a second! You know what? The cost of funding the Iraq War might have been made deliberately to appear to have a little effect on the deficit. Although the use of supplemental appropriations dwindled in the 1990s, spending through supplementals soared, as the War on Terror unfolded. Both the Afghan and Iraq Wars were funded through emergency supplemental appropriations. By doing so, the deficit in the president’s annual budget proposal would look smaller, as a huge chunk of spending is taken out of the regular budget and put in the budget later during the year. It's quite tricky, isn't it? It's like magic!

Some costs associated with the Iraq War should be definitely taken out of the emergency supplementals as many of the expenses could have been anticipated in the regular budget. Such a practice used by the Bush administration may have been performed to defend the economic viability to fund the Iraq War.

Why the War in Iraq is (not) Cheap !

April 10, 2006

Diaz Hendropriyono
Washington, DC

The War in Iraq certainly has not been, and is not going to be, cheap. But, i always wonder why it is so, considering what many thought, before the war began, that it was not going to be an expensive war.

When President Bush announced the War in Iraq, various differing opinions emerged in public in regards to the financial consequences of the war. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the war would cost at least $44 billion. The House Budget Committee expected that it was going to be a short kind of war, one that could be accomplished within two months, followed by a three-month occupation. It was estimated to cost from $48 to $60 billion

The Bush Administration, however, forecasted that the cost of the Iraq war would not exceed the total cost of the first Gulf War, $80 billion in 2003 dollar, and on March 23, 2003 requested $74.7 billion to fund for an emergency spending plan. The cost would include $62.6 billion to fund for the Iraq War, $4.24 billion for antiterrorism defense in the U.S., $5 billion for key allies, and $2.4 billion for humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq

The administration argued that the estimated cost of the Iraq War would amount to less than 1 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and would be considered much cheaper than other wars. The Korean War and the Vietnam War cost U.S. taxpayers 15 percent and 12 percent of U.S. GDP respectively, while World War II spent a whopping 130 percent of GDP, or around $3 trillion, in 2003 dollars. It was then believed that the war could be executed at reasonable cost. John Cogan of the Hoover Institution defended that “at 1% of GDP, the war looks like a bargain.” Furthermore, the defense spending of other countries—such as Israel, the United Kingdom, and Germany, which spent 8.1%, 2.5%, and 1.5% of their GDP in 1999, respectively—made the Iraq War budget appear reasonable.

When considering the cost of the Iraq War, an alternative strategy should also be looked at. Economists from the University of Chicago considered the cost of continuing containment of Saddam. The direct cots of troops and equipment were expected to be $13 billion a year. Since past containment efforts had not been successful, the budget for containment may need to be increased by 50%, raising the cost to $19 billion a year. Furthermore, containment would have to be in place for at least 33 years, an optimistic duration considering the lifetimes of Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, North Korea and Cuba. When the expected cost of containment is discounted to the present, the cost of containment of Saddam would be around $380 billion. Adding the cost for homeland security would bring the total cost to $630 billion. The high cost an alternative strategy made the cost of Iraq War look incredibly small, and thus the Operation Iraqi Freedom was considered the more favorable strategy.

In his testimony to the House Apropriations Defense Subcommittee on September 30, 2003, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld urged legislators to approve the $87 billion supplemental request for FY 2004 as an investment in peace in the Middle East. Rumsfeld compared the administration’s request with the Marshall Plan, or the European Recovery Program. The Marshall Plan provided the basis for European economic recovery after World War II, in a hope to prevent the influence of the communist parties in Western Europe. The reconstruction plan cost about $6 billion. Yet, Rumsfeld continued, “It cost about $90 billion in today’s dollars,” justifying the cheap cost of the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

Finally, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force Gen. Richard Myers claimed that the U.S. would not be “going it alone” in these wars. At least 49 nations would send their troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. The North Atlantic Alliance would also participate. And he was convinced that 70 other countries around the world would help the war on terror worldwide. These factors have driven down the cost of the War in Iraq reflected in the budget request and made the budget seem even more appealing.

Unfortunately, U.S. policies are full of uncertainties. It is mainly because of these that the cost of war becomes unmanageable.

As the Operation Iraqi Freedom continued, uncertainties began to appear. The U.S. military has to always deal with some local resistances: the Jihad group led by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the Saddam loyalists, such as the Ba’athist, the Fedayeen, and the Republican Guards, independent Islamic extremists, and other criminals who kidnap individuals for profits. This unexpected and relentless confrontation has extended the U.S. operation in the area and thus has contributed to the increased costs of the war.

What was once thought to be a cheap operation, then, turned out to be one of the most expensive wars in the U.S. history. At $252 billion, the war’s costs in Iraq and Afghanistan had already exceeded those of World War I and the first Gulf War by mid 2005. Although the amount spent on the War in Iraq had only hit $186 billion by that period, budget professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University Linda Bilmes estimated that it will cost $1.4 trillion by 2010. Meanwhile, economist Joseph Stiglitz assessed the final figure at $1 trillion to $2 trillion. The Congressional Budget Office estimated more conservatively, however, that the war expenses will amount to $600 billion. It seems plausible that these costs will expand as the Pentagon is spending around $6 billion a month on the Iraq War, according to CBO. In fact, the spending increase is reflected in President Bush’s $2.77 trillion budget request in early February 2006, which included increased outlays for the Iraq War.

With the staggering estimates offered by those scholars, it is perhaps arguable that the War in Iraq would still be cheaper than the containment strategy of Saddam Hussein mentioned earlier, estimated to cost around $630 billion.

In addition, The hope that the costs of war and reconstruction efforts could be shared by other allied forces has not fully yet become a reality. Rather than having more allied forces joining the war, the U.S. has started to lose its coalition partners as uncertainties occurred. Bulgaria withdrew its troop in January 2006 after losing 13 soldiers and two truck drivers, who were kidnapped and killed by the Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi group, and two-thirds of its 7.8 million citizens at home voiced out opposition with the war. Ukrainian troops left Iraq in December 2005 after losing 18 soldiers and having three engineers taken hostage. Meanwhile, Nicaraguan soldiers left Iraq for financial reasons, as its President Enrique Bolanos emphasized that the country could no longer afford to keep them there.

As more and more forces left Iraq because of these uncertainties, the U.S. will likely bear most of the costs of the War in Iraq. Thus, a continued budget increase for the war is simply unavoidable. Furthermore, the fact that the U.S. did not win a widespread support as it did in the first Gulf War—that its allies agreed in advance to share the costs of war—forced the U.S. to put much financial burden on its taxpayers, said Leon Panetta, a former budget director for the Clinton administration.

Life is full of uncertainties. Had the world not filled with them, the War in Iraq was actually going to be a cheap war. Really. Perhaps, the current administration just does not realize the extent of these uncertainties on the cost of war.

U.S. Constitution Needs an Update

February 20, 2006

Diaz Hendropriyono
Washington, DC

The U.S. Constitution was written not only to create and distribute federal power into three separate branches, but also to ensure that it was exercised legitimately. And most importantly, it was to be considered as the “Supreme Law of the Land.” The Constitution was meant to be a broad guideline for the republic that, like most rules and regulations, it does not encompass specificity. Regrettably, I argue that for this very reason the Constitution, to a certain extent, fails to serve its purpose.

The Constitution could have been intentionally written broadly, avoiding details. William J. Brennan Jr. asserted that the Framers had anticipated that a changing society would need an elastic and flexible document that could conform to the ages. For example, the word “slavery” was not clearly mentioned in the Constitution although three provisions refer to it: the three-fifths clause in Article 1 Section 2, the importation clause in Article 1 Section 9, and the fugitive clause in Article IV Section 2. It was believed that such a word was impossible to be stated clearly because it was an embarrassment for the American people to allow slavery. In fact, the Framers themselves hoped that this practice would be abolished in the future. And allowing slavery at that time was only a way to secure the Union using general words that would neither sanction slavery nor stain the Constitution.

More elaborately, Frederick Douglass claimed that slavery was treated as a “scaffolding” to build the Union. And once the “building” is built, it was to be removed. It seems that the vagueness of the Constitution was a deliberate attempt by the Framers, realizing that they could not agree on everything, and thus decided that it was wiser to leave interpretation to future generations.

Unfortunately, as a result of these ambiguities in the Constitution, Americans have unnecessarily quarreled over the content and the meaning of the text. For example, the issue of separation of power that the Constitution establishes has created confusion. Each of the three branches is supposed to perform a different and independent task. However, although Article I Section 1 states “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress,” the other two branches could actually become legislative in practice as well.

While the Congress is still entrusted to make laws, the president, having the attention of the public, retains the greater power to propose legislation and veto what the Congress proposes. And even though the Supreme Court is tasked to interpret the law, some of its decisions—such as the 2000 presidential election, criminal procedure and abortion—have turned it into a law-making body. Therefore, a gray area in the Constitution has created a loophole that resulted in an interdependent relationship among the three branches rather than a pure system of separation of powers.

Realizing that these branches share power does not mean that each has an equal power. In fact, each dangerously tries to increase its power over the others. For example, the Supreme Court declared in Marbury v. Madison (1803) that it could nullify an act of Congress if it found the act to be in conflict with the Constitution. The practice of judicial review has altered the balance of power among the three branches. It came as a surprise knowing that the Supreme Court in its early years was not powerful and did not have much “energy, weight, and dignity,” as John Jay said when he was leaving his Chief Justice post to become the Governor of New York in 1795.

The ambiguity of the Constitutional role of the executive power, whether a president is a clerk or a leader, has had a profound impact on the placement of public administration—which actually has no place in the Constitution (well, some say it’s implied). Supporters of a strong legislative branch maintain that the president is the former since he is to execute whatever the Congress legislates. Yet, others argue otherwise by comparing two Articles in the Constitution.

Article II Section 1 states “The executive power shall be vested in a President” while Article I Section 1 states “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress.” The omission of the word herein granted in Article II suggests that the president may legislate whatever the Congress does not legislate. That is, according to some, Congress only possesses legislative powers that are granted by the Constitution. Obviously, this uncertain condition forces public administrators to choose their constitutional master, whether the Congress or the president.

Because of the confusion of who has the power to do what, public administrators are forced to use their own “instinct” to determine an acceptable behavior, which I think is difficult to establish. For example, in 1832 President Jackson worked to dismantle the Bank of the United States and asked the Treasury Secretary William J. Duane to divert the U.S. government deposits away from the Bank. The Secretary refused and thus was replaced by the more cooperative Roger Taney. Duane’s refusal to comply with such a directive provides an ethical argument. Those who believe that the President has the executive power and “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” think it ethically unacceptable to have refused such a presidential order. Yet, others emphasizing the impeachment clause from Article I Section 2 think otherwise. The President and his “men,” whom he shall commission, are actually the Congress’s “men.”

Therefore, although constitutional ambiguities have brought positive effects—such as securing the Union—its ambiguities of the separation of power, the executive and the legislative power, and even the place of the public administration in the government structure, has also created a havoc. Unless this “Supreme Law of the Land” is written in a much more specific manner, this balance of power would undoubtly prevail. I am not asking for intricate details to be added to the U.S. Constitution. But, at least some part of it needs to be updated to avoid unnecessary complication, confusion, and quarrel, so that it provides a clearer balance of power within the three branches without giving the chance for one branch to be harmfully more powerful than the others.